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PRIORITY LIEN STATUTES: THE STATES'
ANSWER TO BANKRUPT HAZARDOUS
WASTE GENERATORS
United States industry generates over 250 million tons of hazardous
waste' each year.2 Both federal and state governments have enacted
legislation to deal with the health and environmental risks created by
mishandled toxic waste.3 This legislation is intended to prevent and
abate dangerous waste sites and, if possible, hold the responsible parties
I. "Hazardous waste" is defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982). The broad definition includes any solid
waste or combination of solid wastes that may cause or contribute to mortality, serious
irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness. Id. § 6903(5). The definition also in-
cludes solid waste that may be a hazard to human health or to the environment if the
waste is improperly managed. Id. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-51 (1982), which
complements RCRA's toxic waste standard provisions by dealing with the liability of
those violating RCRA, refers to "hazardous substances" rather than "hazardous
wastes." CERCLA adopts RCRA's definition of "hazardous substances" and includes
the substances listed in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-
1376 (1982), and the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982). CERCLA also
includes materials that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has labeled haz-
ardous, but CERCLA specifically excludes petroleum, certain natural gases, and syn-
thetic gas usable for fuel. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
2. St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Jan. 20, 1985, at 28, col. 1.
3. Approximately 90% of toxic cleanups are handled by the responsible parties. 14
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1313 (1983). Federal legislation was still necessary, however, to
provide rapid response to the approximately 50,000 mismanaged waste sites and to
stimulate voluntary cleanup responses. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.
Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (holding that CERCLA may impose joint and several
liability on generators and transporters of waste). In the past, about one-half of all
waste sites have been abandoned, resulting in governmental cleanup actions estimated
to cost taxpayers from 13 to 42 billion dollars. 9 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2085 (1979). More
importantly, of the 738 most hazardous waste sites, only six have been made safe. St.
Louis Globe-Democrat, Jan. 20, 1985, at 28, co. 1.
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liable for the government's remedial costs.4
A policy conffict exists when the government attempts to recover
remedial costs from a bankrupt party.' The Bankruptcy Act6 is struc-
tured to provide not only a fair and orderly distribution of the debtor's
assets to his creditors but also to give the debtor a fresh start.7 The
government, however, needs to replenish its funds to enable it to rem-
edy other hazardous sites.' Thus, though government ultimately seeks
to recover as much as possible from the debtor's assets,9 it is restrained
4. See, eg., Tripp, Liability Issues in Litigation under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 52 UMKC L. REV. 364, 396 (1984).
The responsible party may be a waste generator, the owner or operator of a waste site,
or a transporter of waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1982). A waste "generator" is a
chemical manufacturer that produces toxic chemical wastes as a by-product of the
chemicals it markets. See Comment, Generator Liability Under Superfund For Clean-
Up of Abandoned Hazardous Waste Dumpsites, 130 U. PA. L. Rv. 1229, 1230 n.10(1982) (arguing Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively to generators that
created hazardous situations before CERCLA was enacted).
5. See Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir.
1984). In Penn Terra the defendant violated several state pollution regulations. The
state sought an injunction to force the defendant to correct the violations. The defend-
ant, however, had filed a bankruptcy petition and asserted that the state's action was
subject to the Bankruptcy Act's automatic stay. Id. at 269. See infra notes 66-75 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Penn Terra and the automatic stay.
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982).
7. See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971). For a discussion of Perez, see
infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. Extensive federal environmental regulation
and enforcement creates severe difficulties for complying businesses. A corporation
may go bankrupt due to the cost of purchasing resources sufficient to enable it to com-
ply with federal standards. See Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays of Environmental Regulation:
Harvest of Commerical Timber as an Introduction to a Clash of Policies, 12 ENVTL. L. 1
(1981). See also EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64 (1980) (EPA does
not have to consider economic feasibility to grant variances from federal water pollution
regulations).
8. Federal and state governments have attempted to avoid the insolvent generator
problem by requiring proof of financial responsibility before authorizing hazardous
waste-creating activities. See Cohen, New Developments in State Hazardous Waste Leg-
islation, 9 CAP. U.L. REv. 489, 493 (1980); see generally Cohen & Derkics, Financial
Responsibility for Hazardous Waste Sites, 9 CAP. U.L. REv. 509 (1980) (reviews pro-
posed federal mechanisms that insure financial responsibility). Usually, financial re-
sponsibility is assured by requiring the generator to either carry insurance or post a
surety bond. See id. at 514. In addition to recovering its costs, the government fre-
quently penalizes or fines liable hazardous waste generators. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 147-B:11 (Supp. 1986). Discussion of the issues raised by fines and penalties
imposed on bankrupt generators is beyond the scope of this Note.
9. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 467 U.S. 1224 (1985). In Kovacs the State of Ohio
attempted to enforce an injunction that required the debtor to remedy his violations of
state hazardous waste laws. See In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454 (1982), vacated and re-
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by the Bankruptcy Act's harsh limitations on recovery from a debtor.
In response to the restraints the Bankruptcy Act presents in recover-
ing from a bankrupt party or its trustee,' 0 three states enacted legisla-
tion providing the state with a priority lien in bankruptcy
administration." These statutes create a state "superlien."' 2 Using the
statute, the state places a lien on the debtor's property, thus placing the
state in the position of a secured creditor. 3 The Bankruptcy Act ac-
cords secured creditors preferential treatment; secured creditors re-
cover from the bankrupts' assets before unsecured creditors. 4 The
state superliens further aid the state by giving the state's claim prefer-
ence over the claims of other secured creditors.' 5
This Note evaluates the three state superlien statutes. Parts I and II
examine the federal hazardous waste statutes and the relevant Bank-
ruptcy Act provisions. Only after an introduction to these two areas of
federal law can one appreciate the necessity of state superliens. Part
manded, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983). After the Court held that the state's injunction was
subject to the Bankruptcy Act's automatic stay provision, the state argued that the
obligation was not a "claim," thus prohibiting the debtor from using the Bankruptcy
Act to discharge the obligation. See In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984 (6th Cir. 1983). The
Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision and allowed Kovacs to discharge
the debt under I 1 U.S.C § 727(b)(1982). This left the state unable to force Kovacs to
clean up the site. See 465 U.S. 1078, 1081 (1984). For further support of the outcome
in Kovacs, see Mathews, The Scope of Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 339, 371 (1983) (concludes Congress intended claims to be all-inclusive).
10. Depending on whether the trustee successfully abandoned the hazardous waste
site, the state may have to seek collection from the trustee of the bankrupt's estate. See
infra notes 84-107 and accompanying text for discussion of a trustee's abandonment
power.
I. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11 (West Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 21E,
§ 13 (Law. Co-op. 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10 (Supp. 1986).
12. Schwenke & Lockett, Superlien "Solutions" to Hazardous Waste: Bankruptcy
Conflicts, 1983-1984 ENVTL. L. NEWS. (ABA) 1. Congressman Florio introduced a
bill, H.R. 2767, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), that would create a federal superlien. See
infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of H.R. 2767.
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1982).
14. Secured creditors, including those with a valid statutory or judicial lien, bypass
the Bankruptcy Act's main distribution system. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBT-
ORS AND CREDITORS 377 (2d ed. 1982). The lienholder, however, must make sure that
the bankrupt's trustee cannot avoid the lien under any of the provisions of 11 U.S.C.
§ 545 (1982).
15. The statutory language simply refers to precedence over other claims. See, e.g.,
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:l0(III) (Supp. 1986). See also Kessler v. Tarrats, 191
N.J. Super. 273, 466 A.2d 581 (Ch. Div. 1983), aff'd, 194 N.J. Super. 136, 476 A.2d 326
(App. Div. 1984). See infra note 141 and accompanying text for a discussion of Kessler.
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III is a comparative analysis of how these state superlien statutes oper-
ate. Part IV discusses constitutional issues that may arise in superlien
litigation. Part V evaluates the fairness and effectiveness of superlien
provisions as a solution to the environmental law-bankruptcy
conflict.
I. THE MAJORFEDERAL Toxic SUBSTANCES STATUTES
A. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976
In 1976, Congress passed the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA) 16 to replace the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965.17 Be-
cause it was primarily intended to establish toxic waste disposal stan-
dards for existing and future waste generators, RCRA does not
comprehensively regulate past generators or abandoned waste sites.
18
Section 7003 of RCRA, however, authorizes the federal government' 9
to bring an action against generators that create an "imminent and sub-
stantial danger" to public health or the environment.20
Although neither RCRA nor its legislative history defines section
7003's "imminent and substantial danger" standard,21 courts have in-
terpreted the phrase to require a risk of serious harm.22 In order for
16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-87 (1982).
17. Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965).
18. See Note, Superfund Proposed to Clean Up Hazardous Waste Disasters, 20 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 613, 618 (1980). See also Kovaks & Klucsik, The New Federal Role in
Solid Waste Management: The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 3
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 205, 216-20 (1976) (discusses RCRA's objectives and legislative
history). Congress intended RCRA to solve all hazardous waste disposal problems. See
H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6238, 6241-43.
19. States may operate their own hazardous waste programs, but they must meet or
exceed the standards the federal government requires. See F. ANDERSON, D.
MANDELKER & A.D. TARLOCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 558 (1984) [hereinaf-
ter F. ANDERSON].
20. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982). Under the statute, the Environmental Protection
Agency's administrator may sue to "immediately restrain any person contributing to
such handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of waste, to stop such han-
dling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal or to take such other action as may
be necessary." Id. The Administrator is also authorized, after providing notice, to
"take other action under this section including, but not limited to, issuing such order as
may be necessary to protect public health and the environment." Id.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1982).
22. For a discussion of the rationale and application of the "risk of serious harm"
language, see Hinds, Liability Under Federal Law for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 6
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 16-18 (1982).
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the government to institute an abatement action, the risk must be clear.
The danger, however, does not actually have to exist.2"
Courts have used section 7003 to grant broad injunctive relief
against hazardous waste generators.2 4 In United States v. Price25 the
federal government used section 7003 to obtain an injunctive order
against the owners of a hazardous landfill. 2 6 The government sought
an order that would force the landfill owners to finance a study of vari-
ous approaches to clean up the site.2 7 Funding for the study was neces-
sary in order to begin remedying the site.28 The court held that section
7003 authorizes an injunction requiring the generators to appropriate
money for a cleanup.29 The court explained that its order constituted
an injunction because it was a preventative measure and not compensa-
tory in nature.3 0 Because courts interpret section 7003 as authorizing
broad injunctive relief, the federal government is able to use the section
in cleanup actions.
23. See Hinds, supra note 22, at 17-18. See also United States v. Vertac Chem., 489
F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980), modified, 588 F. Supp. 1294 (E.D. Ark. 1984) (holding
that dioxin creates a health threat); United States v. Midwest Solvent Recovery, 484 F.
Supp. 138 (N.D. Ind. 1980) (holding that toxic-contaminated soil is an imminent and
substantial danger); Cohen & Derkics, supra note 8, at 509. Accord, Jones v. Inmont
Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (holding private parties have a cause of
action to recover response costs and may obtain an injunction to abate the dangers
posed by an inactive waste site); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (holding responsible parties liable for
future costs of removal).
24. See Hinds, supra note 22, at 21. RCRA also allows the government to issue
administrative orders that permit the imposition of fines. See id. at 21, 23-24.
25. 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
26. Id. at 208.
27. Id.
28. Id. Accord, United States v. Waste Indus., 734 F.2d 159 (4th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984); United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984). But
see United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (holding
that the government cannot use § 7003 to obtain mandatory injunctive relief).
29. Id. at 212. The court argued that § 7003's legislative history indicates an intent
to authorize the granting of affirmative equitable relief to the extent necessary to elimi-
nate toxic waste risks. Id. at 214. See also S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1980); H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6124.
30. 688 F.2d at 212.
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B. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act of 1980
Four years after enacting RCRA, Congress passed the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CER-
CLA)31 to regulate the cleanup of inactive or abandoned hazardous
waste sites.32 Cleanup under CERCLA proceeds in two ways. Like
RCRA, CERCLA contains an imminent danger provision that autho-
rizes the federal government to seek an order forcing the responsible
parties to remedy the site.3 3
Alternatively, the government may clean the site itself by expending
money from a 1.6 billion dollar "Superfund," and then bringing an
action to recover the costs. 34 Section 107"5 of CERCLA holds the re-
sponsible parties liable for "all costs of removal or remedial action"
and "any other necessary costs of response.",36 First, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) identifies the responsible parties and noti-
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-57 (1982). The Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-29 (1982), also regulates hazardous waste. It contains an imminent hazard
provision that authorizes civil action to abate dangerous conditions, but the provision is
subordinated to RCRA and CERCLA causes of action. See Note, Inactive or Aban-
doned Hazardous Waste Disposal Sites: Coping with a Costly Past, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1709, 1726 (1980).
32. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 568. See also H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120.
33. See F. ANDERSON, supra note 19 at 581.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9607. See Price, Dividing the Costs of Hazardous Waste Site Clean-
ups Under Superfund: Is Joint and Several Liability Appropriate, 52 UMKC L, REV.
339 (1984) (section 9607 authorizes recovery for cleanup costs incurred). Cf United
States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 589 F. Supp. 59 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (past off-site gener-
ators may be liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (government has
broad recovery rights under CERCLA); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F.
Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (government can recover some expenses even though it has
incurred only a portion of total projected expenses at the time of suit).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982).
36. Id. The costs incurred must be consistent with a national contingency plan. Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982) for the Code provision that authorizes the national contin-
gency plan.
Because § 9607(a)(4)(A) allows broad recovery rights, litigation over the necessary
costs of response has been relatively sparse. In Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp.
1425 (S.D. Ohio 1984), the court defined what could be claimed as a "necessary cost of
response." Id. at 1429. After discussing the statutory definitions of "remove," "re-
sponse," and "remedial" the court concluded that § 9607(a)(4)(B) includes in damages
the costs of medical testing, farming wells, and the loss of drinking water. Id.
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fies them that a cleanup is necessary.37 Next, the parties inform the
EPA whether they are willing to assume all or part of the cleanup du-
ties.3" Finally, the EPA and the responsible parties coordinate a
cleanup operation.39
Despite EPA's leading role in CERCLA cleanup efforts, the individ-
ual states have significant rights and duties under the Act. States may
bring an action against the responsible parties to recover remedial
costs' and may also be eligible for federal reimbursement of costs.
41
Under CERCLA, however, states must not only supply ten percent of
the remedial outlays42 but must also finance the future maintenance of
the abandoned waste site.43
The obligations imposed on states under CERCLA have created
heavy financial burdens. The majority of states have raised only one
quarter of the requisite ten percent of the federal government's costs,44
and states have reacted by initiating their own "superfunds. '' 45  To
maintain superfund stability, three states included a superlien
provision.4 6
37. Tripp, supra note 4, at 368.
38. See id.
39. See id. Cleanups are possible even if one industry refuses to cooperate because
CERCLA authorizes cleanups regardless of industry compliance without the govern-
ment bearing the costs. See id. at 369.
40. F. ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 574.
41. Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d) (1982).
42. Id. § 9604(c)(3) (1982).
43. Id. See also Anderson, Hazardous Waste Superfunds: Legislation and Econom-
ics, 52 UMKC L. REv. 388 (1984).
44. See id. at 390.
45. Id. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0923(1) (McKinney 1982);
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25,330 (West Supp. 1984).
46. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. The state and federal governments
may also bring a public nuisance action to abate hazardous waste mismanagement. See
generally Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (holding that federal envi-
ronmental statutes do not preempt federal common law); Note, Allocating the Costs of
Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARV. L. REV. 584, 593-96 (1981) (discussing public
suits).
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II. BANKRUPTcY ACT PROVISIONS THAT LIMIT STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION ACTIONS
A. The Automatic Stay-Section 362
The Bankruptcy Reform Act's47 automatic stay provides immediate
protection from creditors to a debtor who has filed a bankruptcy peti-
tion.48 In a voluntary Chapter 7 proceeding, creditors receive the pro-
ceeds from the debtor's liquidated estate.49 The stay, therefore, enables
the trustee to collect the property of the estate.50 In an involuntary
Chapter 7 proceeding,51 the stay allows the debtor to organize his de-
47. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1982)). For a comprehensive evaluation of the Bankruptcy Act, see AMERICAN EN-
TERPRISE INSTrrUTE, BANYrUPTcY REFORM (1978) (provides supplementary explana-
tion to Code's text).
48. The Act's automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982), reads in pertinent
part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under sec-
tion 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under
this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title; (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or
against property of the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement
of the case under this title; (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate or of property from the estate; (4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any
lien against property of the estate; (5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce
against property of the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a
claim that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (6) any
act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302 or 303 of this title does not
operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental
unit's police or regulatory power; (5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of
the enforcement of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in an
action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's
police or regulatory power....
49. The filing of the bankruptcy petition creates a bankruptcy estate, the property of
which is defined in 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982). See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note
14, at 376.
50. At the commencement of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the court appoints a trustee.
See 11 U.S.C. § 701 (1982). The trustee controls the debtor's non-exempt assets so that
the debtor's estate can be liquidated. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note 14, at
409. See 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1982) for the trustee's additional duties.
51. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note 14, at 410. This Note is limited to
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fense against the petition.52 More importantly, the automatic stay per-
mits the orderly administration of creditor claims"3 and allows debtors
to pursue a discharge from creditor claims.5 4
Section 362(a)'s broad language shields the debtor from nearly all
collection efforts, including governmental enforcement of a court judg-
ment or lien.55 Congress, however, specifically excepted governmental
police power regulations from the stay56 in order to prevent parties
from using the stay as a shelter from the enforcement of state police
Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. In a Chapter 11 Reorganization proceeding, state
environmental regulations remain enforceable because the debtor continues to operate
his business. The Bankruptcy Code, at 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1982), requires Chapter 11
business operators to comply with state laws. In In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739
F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank
v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986), New York State sought
to prevent a trustee from abandoning a hazardous waste processing and storage facility.
739 F.2d at 913. The court, holding that the trustee could not abandon, found § 959(b)
persuasive. Id. at 919. The court argued that § 959(b) could apply to Chapter 7 pro-
ceedings because Chapter 7 trustees may operate the debtor's business in some situa-
tions. Id. But see Missouri v. United States Bankr. Ct., 647 F.2d 768, 778 n.18 (8th
Cir. 198 1) (distinguishing between § 959(b)'s applicability to Chapter 11 and Chapter 7
proceedings); 2 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
66.04(4) (2d ed. 1982). See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
52. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note 14, at 410.
53. See id.
54. See id. Thus, the automatic stay aids creditors as well as debtors. Without it,
creditors would be forced to race to recover on their claims from the debtor's depleting
assets. If a debtor meets the requirements stated in 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982), he is per-
mitted a discharge from unsatisfied debts. Only individuals, however, are allowed dis-
charge under the Act. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1982). See also S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 98, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5884.
55. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(1). The stay applies to all entities, including governmental
units. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14) (1982). See also Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays of Environ-
mental Regulation: Harvests of Commercial Timber as an Introduction to a Clash of
Policies, 12 ENVTL. L. 1, 25 (1981). See generally Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in
Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 177 (1978) (discusses development of the stay and
the issues prompted by its application). "Governmental unit" is defined at 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(21) and includes the federal, state, and municipal governments and their
instrumentalities.
56. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1982). See generally Comment, Bankruptcy Law-When
Is a Governmental Unit's Action to Enforce Its Police or Regulatory Power Exempt from
the Automatic Stay Provisions of Section 362, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 369 (1981) (discuss-
ing how courts have determined which regulations qualify for the stay's exception). See
7 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (C. Nichols 3d ed. 1981)
for a thorough treatment of the police power.
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power regulations.5 7
Courts have no difficulty in applying the stay's police power regula-
tion exception to state environmental regulation actions. In Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources v. Peggs Run Coal Co. 5 the court
held that a state action seeking the posting of bonds and injunctive
relief against an air and water polluter qualified as an exception to the
stay.5 9 Similarly, the court in In Re Canarico Quarries, Inc.6' con-
cluded that the stay's exception encompassed a state administrative
board order that prohibited debtor from operating his business in viola-
tion of air pollution regulations.61
The Bankruptcy Act, however, does not extend application of the
stay's police power exception to actions that serve the government's
pecuniary interest in the debtor's property. 62 Section 362(b)(5) prohib-
its the enforcement of a money judgment rendered under the state's
police power. Thus, actions to enforce money judgments do not come
within the police power exception. Although Congress wanted to limit
interference with police power regulations, it found that similar limita-
tions were not necessary to protect the government's fiscal resources.63
Section 362(b)(5) effectively prevents the government from obtaining
preferential treatment over similarly situated creditors.64
Applying section 362(b)(5), courts have had difficulty distinguishing
between money judgments and injunctions. 65 An injunctive order may
compel a debtor or his trustee to spend much of the estate's assets to
comply. In Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Re-
57. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5838-41.
58. 55 Pa. Commw. 312, 423 A.2d 765 (1980).
59. Id. at 316, 423 A.2d at 767.
60. 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.C.P.R. 1979).
61. Id. at 1340.
62. See Aaron, supra note 55, at 6.
63. For legislative history supporting a narrow construction of the government's
ability to invoke the police power exception for financial reasons, see 124 CONo. Rac.
517, 409 (Oct. 6, 1978).
64. See Aaron, supra note 55, at 7 n.22. The author contends that the policy of
putting the government in the same position as private creditors runs throughout the
Bankruptcy Act. See id.
65. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ft. Misery Highway Dist., 22 F.2d
369, 372 (9th cir. 1927), the court defined money judgment as "one that adjudges the
payment of a sum of money, as distinguished from one directing an act to be done or
property to be transferred or restored."
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sources6 the Third Circuit defined a money judgment under section
362(b)(5). Reversing the previous bankruptcy court and district court
decisions, the court held that a state's injunction action was not an
action for a money judgment.6 ' The injunction would force Penn
Terra, a Chapter 7 debtor, to operate its coal mines in compliance with
state environmental statutes.68 Penn Terra contended that the sub-
stance of the state's "injunction" constituted a money judgment. 69 Re-
jecting Penn Terra's argument, the court stated that a money judgment
contains two elements.70 It must identify the opposing parties7 and
specify "a definite and certain designation of the amount" that the
claimant will recover.72 Furthermore, the court observed, the Bank-
ruptcy Act allows the state to record a money judgment.73 The auto-
matic stay only prevents the state from enforcing a money judgment.74
In support of its decision, the court pointed out that the state was
merely seeking to prevent future environmental damage, rather than
obtain compensation for Penn Terra's previous violations.75
Though Penn Terra presents valid arguments for restricting applica-
tion of the automatic stay, other courts have ruled differently. A re-
cent case is In re Kovacs. 6  In Kovacs the debtor breached an
agreement to clean up a hazardous waste site and to refrain from fur-
ther polluting water by operating his industrial waste business. 77 Re-
acting to the breach, the state instituted an action to appoint a receiver
of Kovacs' non-exempt assets. 78 The state also wanted to encumber
Kovacs' future earnings to help fund the cleanup operation.79 The
court invoked the automatic stay to prevent the state from encumber-
ing future earnings, finding the request indistinguishable from a money
66. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 275.
68. Id. at 270.
69. Id. at 275.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 277.
76. 681 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated and remanded, 459 U.S. 1167 (1983).
77. 681 F.2d at 454.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 455.
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judgment. 80
A court may lift the automatic stay in one of three ways. First, the
stay is removed if the court dismisses the bankruptcy petition.81 Sec-
ond, the stay is terminated if the court discharges the debtor from his
debts.82 Finally, the Bankruptcy Act authorizes creditors to request
the stay's termination.83
B. The Abandonment Power
In a Chapter 7 proceeding a trustee collects and liquidates the prop-
erty of the debtor's estate and distributes the proceeds to the credi-
tors.84 To maximize the distributable amount, the Bankruptcy Act
authorizes either the trustee or the bankruptcy court to abandon cer-
tain property. The trustee may abandon any property that burdens the
estate or is of inconsequential value.85
"Burdensome" is a term of art that refers to property that is so heav-
ily subject to taxes, liens, or other encumbrances that the property is
virtually worthless.86 Of equal significance is the term "inconsequen-
tial," which refers to the debtor's lack of equity in the property.8 7
The Bankruptcy Act recognizes that creditors may desire to aban-
don the property even when the trustee or court does not. The Act
allows a "party in interest" to petition the bankruptcy court to compel
the trustee to abandon worthless property.88 A creditor must hold a
possessory interest in the property to qualify as a party in interest.89 A
80. Id. at 456. Accord, Donovan v. TMC Indus., Ltd., 20 Bankr. 997 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1982) (holding that an injunction requiring debtor to pay wages and overtime is
equivalent to a money judgment, and, therefore, subject to the stay); But see Depart-
ment of Envtl. Resources v. Peggs Run Coal Co., 55 Pa. Commw. 312, 423 A.2d 765
(1980) (holding that an action for injunctive relief and posting of bond is not a money
judgment and is excepted from the stay).
81. See D. EPsTEiN & J. LANDERS, supra note 14, at 411.
82. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (1982).
83. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)-(g) (1982). See generally Martin, Creditor Alternatives to
Obtain Relieffrom Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy, 87 CoM. L.J. 22 (1982) (discusses
the advantage to creditor means of obtaining relief from the stay).
84. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note 14, at 421.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1982). Before the trustee can exercise the abandonment
power he must provide notice and a hearing. Id.
86. Martin, supra note 83, at 34.
87. Id.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 554(b) (1982).
89. See Martin, supra note 83, at 34.
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creditor might benefit from abandonment if ownership rights revert to
him. This will be the result if, for example, the creditor holds a lien on
the property.90 A state creditor, however, will not benefit from acquir-
ing ownership of a toxic waste site requiring substantial cleanup. Thus,
a state is unlikely to initiate abandonment.
After a trustee or court exercises the abandonment power, the debtor
reacquires ownership rights because the estate no longer owns the
property.91 If the debtor is discharged from his outstanding debts, he
owns the abandoned property free from all claims.
92
Under the Bankruptcy Act, however, only individuals, not corpora-
tions, can obtain a discharge.93 Thus, discharge is not an issue when a
state is attempting to recover cleanup costs from a corporation. A
bankrupt corporation, which owns little more than its exempted assets
and other abandoned property, will not have sufficient assets to cover
the massive costs of a toxic waste cleanup.94 The state, therefore, is not
likely to benefit from abandonment.
Courts usually will not permit abandonment because they realize it
would leave the state remediless. In In re Quanta Resources Corp.95
the debtor, Quanta Resources, operated a waste oil storage and
processing plant. The plant was contaminated with large quantities of
PCB, a toxic waste, when the debtor filed for bankruptcy.96 The
trustee gave notice of his interest to abandon the site and the State of
New York objected, arguing, inter alia,97 that abandonment would
90. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note 14, at 516. Technically, abandon-
ment may be to any person with a possessory interest in the property. Id.
91. Id. See also In re Perry, 29 Bankr. 787 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983) (upon abandon-
ment by trustee, property leaves the estate and reverts to debtor); In re Enriquez, 22
Bankr. 934 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982) (abandonment of property by trustee divests control
of property); In re Motley, 10 Bankr. 141 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982) (upon abandonment
by trustee, real estate is no longer property of estate). But see In re Erwin, 25 Bankr.
363 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (abandoned property reverts to lien holder, not debtor).
92. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1982).
93. See id. § 727(a)(1).
94. For a listing of exemptions see 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1982).
95. 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey
Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986).
96. Id. at 913.
97. The state argued that under 11 U.S.C. § 959(b) the debtor must comply with all
state laws. Id. at 914. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
In Gillis v. California, 293 U.S. 62 (1934), for example, a state licensing agency re-
quired a debtor to post bond before he could distribute fuel. The Court, rejecting the
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controvert public policy.98 The state pointed out that abandonment
would vest title to the site in Quanta, which lost its assets upon com-
mencement of the bankruptcy case.9 9 Because Quanta could not help
fund the state's cleanup,"c° the site, unless remedied, would exist in
continual violation of the state's environmental protection statutes.101
The court held that the trustee could not abandon the toxic site,
reasoning that state statutes should be enforced unless the Bankruptcy
Act preempts them.'0 2 The court recognized the absence of legislative
history on the abandonment power, and relied on case law to find that
the Bankruptcy Act does not preempt state police power regulations,
including environmental protection statutes. 10 3 The court emphasized
that a toxic site creates a threat to public health."°
In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Environ-
mental Protection105 the Supreme Court affirmed the Quanta decision.
Justice Powell, writing for the Court in a 5-4 decision, relied on case
law to rule that Congress intended to prohibit abandonment in contra-
vention of laws protecting public health or safety.10 6 Because the
Court limited the exception to the abandonment power to particular
laws and situations in which harm is not "speculative," the ability to
debtor's claim to enjoin the state's requirement, stated that Congress intended to force
debtors to comply with state law. Id. at 66.
The Gillis case can be distinguished from Quanta. Gillis was a reorganization case in
which the debtor continued operating his business. In Quanta, a Chapter 7 case, the
debtor's business was liquidated for distribution. But see Wein, Environmental Regula-
tion and the Bankruptcy Act, 17 DuQ. L. REv. 133, 141 (1978-79) (finds Gillis indicative
of congressional intent to prohibit all bankrupts from violating state police power
regulations).
98. 739 F.2d at 914.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 916.
104. Id. The Quanta court cited the analogous case of Ottenheimer v. Whitaker,
198 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1952). In Ottenheimer the trustee wanted to abandon some
floating barges anchored in Baltimore harbor. Id. at 289. The court recognized that
abandonment would vest title in the incapable bankrupt, and prohibited abandonment.
Id. at 290. The court asserted that the bankrupt would allow the barges to sink, thereby
blocking navigation and violating federal law by causing a hazard. Id. The 01-
tenheimer court did not rely on public policy. Nevertheless, Quanta is similar because
in both cases abandonment would likely result in the violation of law.
105. 106 S. Ct. 755 (1986), rehrg denied, 106 S. Ct. 1482 (1986).
106. Id. at 759-60.
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use the abandonment power remains largely undefined.' °7
III. How THE SUPERLIEN STATUTES OPERATE
State superlien statutes enable the state to circumvent many of the
Bankruptcy Act's obstacles to recovery. States need to maintain suffi-
cient resources to conduct thorough cleanups. A state can improve its
recovery position under the Bankruptcy Act by obtaining secure credi-
tor status.10 8 Enforcement of the state's superlien statute furnishes it
with a lien that assures the state secured creditor status.10 9
The three existing state superlien statutes differ significantly. For
example, two of the three require the state to file a statement of claim
to secure the lien. 1 o A statement of claim notifies subsequent purchas-
ers that the state holds a lien on the property.
The statutes vary concerning the type of claims under which the
107. Id. at 760, 762 n.9. Justice Rehnquist authored a strong dissent that refuted
the majority's interpretation of congressional intent and asserted that the Court cannot
search for a congressional intent to support an exception to the abandonment power.
Id. at 763. Citing the fact that Congress explicitly excluded certain environmental in-
junctions from the automatic stay proviso, Justice Rehnquist inferred that the Court
must rely only on the statutory language when dealing with abandonment. Id. at 763-
64.
108. A secured creditor's lien represents a present interest in the debtor's property.
Under 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982), the lien never becomes part of the bankruptcy estate.
See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, supra note 14, at 514.
If the state does not procure secured creditor status, or if the property the state is
interested in is worth less than the state's claim, then the state is in the position of an
unsecured creditor. The Bankruptcy Act's priority provision, 11 U.S.C. § 507, dictates
the distribution of the proceeds from the debtor's liquidated estate.
The estate's administrative expenses are the first priority. Id. The expenses that
qualify as administrative are listed in 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1982), and includes expenses
necessary to preserve the estate. Id. In In re Vermont Real Estate Investment Trust, 25
Bankr. 804 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1982), the court allowed the City of Montpelier to recover its
expenses under the administrative expense provision. Id. at 805. The city incurred the
expenses when it removed the debtor's dangerously constructed building. Id. The court
declared that the expenses were necessary to preserve the debtor's estate. Id. at 806.
The administrative expense provision is therefore an alternative means of recovering
cleanup expenses. It may be used either in conjunction with or without a statutory lien.
The expenses must, however, be necessary to preserve the debtor's estate. 3A COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY § 62.1411] (L. King 15th ed. 1979).
109. A "lien" is defined at 11 U.S.C. § 101(28) as a "charge against or interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." Section 101(39)
defines a statutory lien as a lien "arising solely by force of a statute on specified circum-
stances or conditions .. "
110. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13 (Law. Co-op. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:10-23.11f (West Supp. 1986).
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states may recover. The Massachusetts provision allows recovery for
any liability imposed under its general toxic waste statute, plus twelve
percent interest per year on the debt.111 The general statute holds re-
sponsible parties liable for all cost the state incurred while investigating
or conducting a cleanup, and authorizes a civil fine.112 The New
Hampshire superlien statute entitles the state to recover any amount
spent from its superfund because of the waste generator's acts or omis-
sions.1 13 The state, however, may not place a lien on property to re-
cover any fines or penalties. 14 The New Jersey superlien statute
resembles New Hampshire's; the state may use the lien only to recover
its cleanup expenses.
1 15
The superlien provisions also identify what property the state may
encumber. In New Jersey all of the debtor's revenue, real property,
and personal property are subject to the lien.1 16 Again, New Hamp-
shire's superlien statute is similar to New Jersey's, except that only
business revenues, not personal revenues, are subject to New Hamp-
shire's lien.1 17 Originally, Massachusetts could place a lien on all
debtor's real and personal property regardless of whether the debtor
acquired ownership before or after incurring the debt.11 8 In response
to political pressure1 19 the state amended the act to include only prop-
erty located on the hazardous waste site. 120
A critical issue arising under superliens is whether the state's lien
takes priority over other secured creditor's claims. The Massachusetts
statute clearly gives the state priority over all other creditors. 121 The
New Jersey and New Hampshire statutes give the state's lien priority
over "all other claims." 122 These statutes make state claims superior to
111. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13.
112. Id. § 11.
113. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10 (Supp. 1986).
114. Id.
115. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11f.
116. Id.
117. N.H. RV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10.
118. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13.
119. The Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation left the Massachusetts mort-
gage market because of the effect the encumbrance could have on various properties.
See Schwenke & Lockett, supra note 12, at 2.
120. Id.
121. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 13.
122. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-2311f; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-B:10.
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all creditors, secured or not, by simply using the word "claim." The
statute may not, however, subordinate other secured claims.123
Courts have not defined the scope of any superlien application.
Clearly, resolution of statutory ambiguities will have a crucial effect on
the states' recovery rights, debtor obligations, and secured creditors'
rights.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY STATE
SUPERLIEN STATUTES
Although state superliens heavily burden both debtors and creditors,
they serve an important state objective. Consequently, courts con-
fronted with constitutional challenges to superlien statutes usually
sympathize with the challengers but hesitate to invalidate the statutes.
Claimants can make three constitutional attacks on the superliens:
preemption by the Bankruptcy Act; and violation of the Constitution's
contract clause and taking clause.
A. Whether the Bankruptcy Act Preempts State Superlien Statutes
When Congress exercises an enumerated power, as it did when it
enacted the Bankruptcy Act under the supremacy clause, the federal
legislation preempts all directly conflicting state legislation.124 The
state statute must give way, however, only if the state and federal legis-
lation unavoidably conflict.' 25 Thus, a debtor or creditor subjected to
a superlien could challenge the lien by asserting that it hinders the
Bankruptcy Act's objectives of giving the debtor a fresh start and dis-
tributing the debtor's non-exempt assets equitably.
123. New Jersey's superlien was tested in Kessler v. Tarrats, 191 N.J. Super. 273,
466 A.2d 581 (Ch. Div. 1983), aff'd, 194 N.J. Super. 136, 476 A.2d 326 (App. Div.
1984). In Kessler the administrator of New Jersey's Spill Compensation Fund at-
tempted to assert the state's claim ahead of other secured interests. Id. at 281, 466 A.2d
at 585. A mortgage holder, one of the displaced secured creditors, challenged the super-
lien's constitutionality. Id. The court upheld both the state's first priority position and
the superlien's constitutionality. See infra notes 141-48, 164-65 and accompanying text.
124. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317 (11th ed. 1985). See also Mc-
Dermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913) (holding state regulations invalid because
compliance would violate federal law). The Constitution explicitly grants Congress the
power to enact bankruptcy legislation. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
125. G. GUNTHER, supra note 124, at 317. See also Burbank v. Lockheed Air Ter-
minal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973) (holding a city ordinance restricting airport operation hours
invalid because it interfered with a federal statute's objectives).
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
390 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 31:373
In Perez v. Campbell 126 the Supreme Court dealt with such a claim.
A state statute mandated revocation of a driver's registration and li-
cense if the driver failed to satisfy a court judgment within sixty days,
even if the driver was insolvent.' 27 The Court held that the statute
unduly interfered with the federal policy of giving a bankrupt debtor a
new start, unrestricted by previous debts. 128
The superlien statutes, however, are designed to operate within the
framework of the Bankruptcy Act.12 9 The state simply makes itself a
lienholder through superliens. The Bankruptcy Act favors lienholders
by giving them a priority preference. 130 By acquiring lienholder status,
the state works within and does not defeat bankruptcy objectives.
B. The Contract Clause
The contract clause prohibits states from passing laws that "impair
the obligation of contracts."' 13 1 The clause protects private contracting
parties from state action. 132 Courts have used the clause to protect
creditors from debtor relief legislation. 133 Debtor relief laws interfere
with a creditor's collection rights-rights for which he contracted. 134
The Supreme Court tempered the clause by limiting its application to
state laws that operate retroactively to affect contracts already in
existence.135
Because the state is allowed broad discretion to regulate the eco-
nomic rights of citizens, 136 the contract clause is an important means
126. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
127. See id.
128. See id. at 654. One author distinguished Perez from cases arising in the envi-
ronmental protection content. In Perez one citizen benefitted from the state regulation.
In contrast, the public benefits from environmental protection regulations. See Wein,
supra note 97, at 145. The Court may be less inclined to hold that the Bankruptcy Act
preempts a critical police function.
129. State laws have an important role in bankruptcy administration. See, e.g., In
re Dawson, 10 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (interpreting a state exemption
allowed under 11 U.S.C. § 522).
130. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
131. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10.
132. G. GUNTHER, supra note 124, at 487.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827) (holding a state insol-
vency statute valid because it did not operate retroactively).
136. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (rejecting a due
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of protecting private economic rights. 137 In Allied Structural Steel Co.
v. Spannaus138 the Supreme Court applied the contract clause to a
state law that regulated employers' pension funds. 139 The Court struck
down the state law, holding that it fatally changed the contractual obli-
gations employers assumed when they established the funds."4 The
Allied Structural Steel decision, therefore, interpreted the contract
clause to protect citizens from overly intrusive state regulation. 141
State superlien statutes clearly interfere with debtor-creditor rela-
tions and present a contract clause issue. In Kessler v. Tarrats142 a
mortgage holder argued that New Jersey's superlien was unconstitu-
tional under the contract clause. 143 The claimant attempted to fore-
close a mortgage that he had acquired and recorded not only before the
state recorded its superlien,'" but before the state enacted the super-
lien statute.145 Although the claimant contended that the statute im-
permissibly operated retroactively, 146 his contractual right to foreclose
was subordinated to the state's lien.
The court rejected the claimant's contract clause argument, 147 as-
serting that a state may enact laws that protect public health despite
process challenge to a state statute that regulated economic rights because the law
might be rationally related to a legitimate state end).
137. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 124, at 475.
138. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
139. Id. at 240.
140. Id. at 250-51. The Court pointed out that the state statute did more than
nullify the employer's contractual obligations. The Court stated that the statute "im-
poses a completely unexpected liability in potentially disabling amounts." Id. at 247.
141. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 124, at 498.
142. 191 N.J. Super. 273, 466 A.2d 581 (Ch. Div. 1983), aff'd, 194 N.J. Super. 136,
476 A.2d 326 (App. Div. 1984).
143. Id. at 281, 466 A.2d at 585.
144. Id. The state incurred expenses when it removed and tested toxic waste taken
from the site. Id. at 297, 466 A.2d at 595.
145. Id. at 281, 466 A.2d at 585. The original mortgage holder recorded before the
state enacted the superlien provision. The claimant, however, acquired title two years
after the statute was in effect. Id. at 287-88, 466 A.2d at 589. Because the claimant had
two years notice of the statute, the court rejected his due process claim. Id. at 288, 466
A,2d at 589. The court cited Gibraltar Factors Corp. v. Slapo, 41 N.J. Super. 381, 125
A.2d 309 (App. Div. 1956), aff'd, 23 N.J. 459, 125 A.2d 567, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S.
13 (1957), and charged the claimant with knowledge of all previously enacted state
statutes. 191 N.J. Super. at 287-88, 466 A.2d at 589.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 305, 466 A.2d at 600.
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the impairment of a prior contractual right.14 The court also ac-
knowledged the state's purpose of assuring funds sufficient to abate
hazardous conditions. 149 The court, therefore, considered the state's
pecuniary interest in the debtor's property a legitimate object of the
state's police power.
The United States Supreme Court employs a three part test when
deciding contract clause claims. 5 First, the court decides whether the
state law substantially impairs a contractual relationship. 51 This is
merely a threshold inquiry that superlien statutes clearly satisfy. The
statutes can divest a secured creditor of a perfected security interest
that the creditor contracted to obtain. The mortgage holder's loss in
Kessler is an excellent example of how superliens can change contrac-
tual expectations.
The second part of the Court's test requires the state to show that
the statute is intended to serve a significant and legitimate public pur-
pose.152 Undoubtedly, remedying the dangerous situation that mis-
managed toxic waste sites create is a significant and legitimate public
purpose. The superlien provisions, however, are intended to protect
the state's pecuniary interest in the property. Thus, the state must
show that unless the statute protects its monetary interest, it will not be
able to maintain the funds necessary to deal with the toxic waste
threat.
The third part of the Supreme Court's test, applied after the state has
shown a significant and legitimate public purpose, requires the court to
determine if the law is based on reasonable conditions and appropri-
ately serves the purpose articulated.1 53  The state must demonstrate
that the lien is a sound approach to recovering its costs. The state may
also have to show why alternative methods of funding are
unacceptable.
148. Id. at 289, 466 A.2d at 590. The court relied on two Supreme Court decisions.
See Northwestern Fertilization Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 667 (1878) (holding an
ordinance that prohibited nuisance-creating businesses valid even though the legislature
granted a corporate charter); Erie R. Co. v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 254 U.S. 394
(1920) (ordered incorporated railroad to comply with a state law enacted after incorpo-
ration, and required railroad to construct multi-million dollar crossings).
149. See 191 N.J. Super. at 300, 466 A.2d at 597.
150. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400
(1983).
151. Id. at 411-12.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 412.
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The state may find it difficult to argue that there are no feasible alter-
natives to the superlien. Unquestionably, the superlien is intended to
hold the party responsible for the cleanup costs liable. In their opera-
tion, however, the statutes penalize innocent parties. Other secured
creditors may not be even remotely culpable and may, in fact, have
acquired an interest in the property without notice of the superlien's
existence. In short, depending on how strictly a court applied the three
part test, superlien statutes raise serious contract clause issues.154
C. The Taking Clause
The fifth amendment states that the government cannot take private
property for public use without paying just compensation. 55 The fifth
amendment taking clause applies to state action through the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause.1 56 Like the contract clause, the tak-
ing clause protects private economic interests from state interfer-
ence.' 57 The taking clause does not prevent the state from acquiring
private property rights, but instead limits the state's eminent domain
powers by imposing the just compensation and public use
requirements.
Courts have distinguished between state eminent domain actions and
state police power regulations,' 58 maintaining that police power regula-
tions are not fifth amendment takings and thus do not require the state
to pay compensation." 9 Courts use several criteria in determining
154. The state has considerable power to protect the public from toxic waste and
other threats to health. In Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934),
the Supreme Court upheld retroactive application of a state law to a debtor's obliga-
tions. Under the law, courts could grant extensions to debtors threatened with mort-
gage foreclosure. Id. at 416. The Court declared that the state could retroactively
impair the debtor-creditor contract to serve vital public interests. Id. at 434. The Court
stated that the "[r]eservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is ... read into
contracts." Id. at 435.
155. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
156. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
157. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 124, at 475.
158. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTER, THE TAKING ISSUE
(1973) (tracing the history of Supreme Court rulings on the taking clause); Gordon,
Compensable Regulatory Taking; A Tollbooth Rises on Regulation Road, 12 REAL EST.
L.J. 211 (1983) (discussing the eminent domain-police power regulation distinction).
159. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1888) (holding state did not have to pay
compensation to a brewer whose rights were curtailed by a state law that prohibited the
manufacture of liquor.)
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whether a state action is an eminent domain action or a police power
regulation."6 In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that even po-
lice power regulations can be considered a taking if they sufficiently
invade a property owner's rights. In these instances, the state is re-
quired to pay just compensation.1 61
Courts have designated "noxious use" cases as a subject area in
which a state's regulation generally is not considered a taking.1 62 A
court confronts a noxious use case when the property owner uses his
property in a way that threatens the health or safety of the public. 163
Because the state's regulation is merely a police power reaction to the
threat the property owner created, the state's regulation is not consid-
ered a taking, regardless of its effect on the value of the property. 64
In Kessler, for example, the mortgagee claimed that the state, by en-
forcing its superlien to his detriment, "took" his secured creditor's
rights165 without paying just compensation. 166  The court, without
elaborating, rejected the claimant's taking argument and asserted that
the state was simply using its police power to regulate a nuisance.' 67
160. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1184-1201 (1967)
(evaluating the merits of the different approaches the courts have taken); Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
161. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (holding that if
regulation "goes too far" it is a taking).
162. See Sax, supra note 160, at 39.
163. The state's power to terminate noxious property uses is an extension of the
state's traditional power to abate nuisances. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Alger, 61
Mass. (7 Cush.) 63 (1851) (statute enjoining erection of a wharf not a taking but a
prohibition of a noxious use); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding state
law authorizing destruction of red cedar trees without paying compensation because of
their harmful rust).
164. See Sax, supra note 160, at 39; Michelman, supra note 160, at 1196-1201.
165. Kessler, 191 N.J. Super. at 281, 466 A.2d at 585. A secured creditor's rights in
the debtor's assets are property rights protected by the taking clause. United States v.
Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75-76 (1982).
166. 191 N.J. Super. at 287, 466 A.2d at 585. A bankruptcy trustee asserted a
similar taking argument in Quanta. The trustee contended that if the court refused to
allow him to abandon the hazardous waste site, the result would be a severe depletion of
the estate's assets because the estate would be forced to spend money to comply with
state law. 739 F.2d 912, 914 (3d Cir. 1984). The trustee claimed that the state would be
taking the estate's secured creditors' rights by prohibiting abandonment. Id. See supra
notes 95-103 and accompanying text for discussion of Quanta.
167. 191 N.J. Super. at 288-96, 466 A.2d at 589-95.
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Though cleanup is a justified police power act, it does not end the tak-
ing inquiry.
The state superliens do not constitute a taking if they affect only the
responsible parties. Under noxious use-nuisance taking analysis, no
taking occurs when the property owner is at fault for creating the haz-
ard.168 The responsible party's insolvency also alters the focus of tak-
ing analysis. The superliens expropriate the secured creditor's
property rights without affecting the debtor. The debtor renounces his
ownership by filing the bankruptcy petition. In superlien litigation the
real issue is whether the state divests the other creditors, not the
debtor, of their rights.'
69
Secured creditors, on the other hand, can assert a strong taking
claim. They can argue that the state should abate a noxious property
use without paying compensation only if it is a matter of public neces-
sity. 70 Undoubtedly, hazardous waste cleanup is an important state
function. The superlien, though protecting the state's pecuniary inter-
est in a site that it has remedied, does not enable the state to clean up a
site. Thus, balanced against its harsh effect on creditors' rights, the
superlien may not be a matter of public necessity.
To determine the environmental superlien's constitutionality, a court
can apply decisions on superliens outside of the environmental law
context. In Provident Institution for Savings v. Jersey City,17 1 for exam-
ple, the Supreme Court upheld a statute that supplied Jersey City with
a lien to recover delinquent water rents. 1 72 The claimant, a mortgage
holder, lost his priority position. 73 The Provident Institution lien is
similar to an environmental superlien because it also protects the
state's financial resources.
A more common priority lien exists when states enact legislation
that authorizies destruction of subcode buildings that are a public nui-
sance. ' 7  The state's lien has priority over all claims except liens for
168. See supra note 163.
169. The dissenting judge in Quanta made a similar argument in response to the
majority's quick disposal of the taking claim. See 739 F.2d at 923 (Gibbons, J., dissent-
ing). Accord, In re New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 330 F. Supp. 131, 147 (D.
Conn. 1971) (stating that the taking clause limits the state's ability to erode the debtor's
assets).
170. 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 56, § 24.574.
171. 113 U.S. 506 (1885).
172. Id. at 516.
173. Id. at 508.
174. 7 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 56, § 24.561.
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taxes or assessments. 175 Given the constitutionality of these liens, envi-
ronmental superliens may also be valid. Courts will hesitate to invali-
date a law intended to aid toxic waste cleanup, particularly if the state
convinces the court that superliens are essential to effectively conduct
cleanups.
V. THE FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF STATE
SUPERLIEN STATUTES
Apart from the serious constitutional issues superliens present, the
statutes pose other difficulties. Superliens clearly limit a creditor's re-
covery rights. Depending on the particular statute, the superlien may
also fail to notify subsequent purchasers of encumbered property of the
state's claim. These problems prompt an inquiry into whether super-
liens are the sole and best method of protecting the state's monetary
resources.
The importance of the government's presence to regulate and ensure
cleanups is evident. Without government regulation, residents
threatened by toxic waste danger would bear both the costs of cleanups
and the risk of harm. 176 Because cleanups are an unprofitable venture,
the private sector will not act until absolutely necessary. 177 With gov-
ernment-initiated cleanups, cleanup costs are reduced and the danger is
effectively abated before it becomes an irreversible threat. In addition,
the costs are more fairly distributed than when only those threatened
pay.
Unless a funding mechanism like a superfund exists, taxpayers bear
the cleanup costs. Even when the government's superfund largely con-
sists of generator contributions, the generators can pass the increased
costs on to consumers. 178 Taxpayers must also cover any deficit be-
175. Id See, ag., Brown v. Tobriner, 312 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (state lien for
expenses incurred to remove unsafe building given priority over deed of trust); City of
Chicago v. City Realty Exch., 127 Ill. App. 2d 185, 262 N.E.2d 230 (1970) (lien on
demolition costs subordinated to tax lien); Cleveland Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Lincoln
Property Management Co., 22 Ohio App. 2d 157, 259 N.E.2d 512 (1970) (lien on demo-
lition costs given priority over mortgage).
176. See Note, Allocating the Costs of Hazardous Waste Disposal, 94 HARv. L. REV.
584, 585 (1981) (examining the effect of legislation on cost distribution).
177. See id. at 587.
178. See id. at 586. See also Note, Superfund Proposal to Clean Up Hazardous
Waste Disasters, 20 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 613, 623 (1980) (arguing that consumers ulti-
mately bear costs of cleanup regardless of who conducts it).
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tween the superfund and the actual cost of cleanup.179
Distributing cleanup costs among the public is fair because hazard-
ous waste production is an unavoidable external cost of operating a
business in a technological sophisticated society. 8 The public benefits
from both the cleanups and the products or processes that produce the
waste. The public should further welcome government initiated
cleanup programs because the consequences of improper waste man-
agement are life threatening.
Superliens distort the fair cost distribution that exists under joint
industry-public funding, and disproportionately burden those whose
claims are subordinated to the state's lien. The lien enables the state to
gain a priority position in bankruptcy claims,181 but it penalizes other
innocent creditors.
Superliens have additional undesirable effects. For example, fearing
subordination to the lien, creditors may refrain from extending credit
to potential violators of state hazardous waste laws. Creditors would
at least exact a higher price to reflect their increased risk.
182
As an encumbrance on property, superliens affect real estate transac-
tions. If the state does not have to file a statement of claim, subsequent
purchasers of the encumbered property may not have notice of the
lien.183 This is particularly true if the state can encumber any of the
debtor's real and personal property. If the state can place the lien only
on the waste site, a subsequent purchaser should at least have notice
that the property is subject to environmental regulations.
The lack of notice problem prompted the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation to withdraw from a segment of the Massachusetts
179. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
180. See Note, supra note 178, at 623.
181. Courts have encountered a plethora of cases in which corporations use the
Bankruptcy Act to avoid state regulation. See, eg., In re Dolly Madison Indus., Inc.,
504 F.2d 499 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that court lacks authority under Bankruptcy Act
to order the state to grant debtor an operating license); Bay Ridge Inn, Inc. v. New
York State Liquor Auth., 94 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1938) (state cancelled liquor license of
trustee for violating state law); Colonial Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne, 420 F. Supp. 44 (D.
Mass. 1976) (holding that bankrupt's status did not prevent state from enforcing liquor
laws). But see In re Parkchester Gen. Hosp., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 292 (S.D.N.Y.
1978) (state cannot revoke hospital's operating certificate after court authorized hospi-
tal's continued operation); In re Hillsdale Foundry Co., 1 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 195
(W.D. Mich. 1974) (holding that Congress intended to permit bankrupt's continued
operation without state interference).
182. See Schwenke & Lockett, supra note 12, at 3.
183. Id.
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mortgage market. 184 The Corporation apparently felt threatened by
the potential encumbering of property to which it held a mortgage,
despite the fact that the Corporation's loan was unrelated to hazardous
waste management. Massachusetts subsequently amended its superlien
provision to limit the lien to waste sites.1 85
Despite the shortcomings of superliens, a federal superlien proposal
is pending before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
The House proposal would insert a superlien provision into both
RCRA and CERCLA. 186 The bill would give federal and state claims
for cleanup costs priority over all other claims, secured or un-
secured.18 7 The government would not have to file a statement of
claim. More importantly, the proposal fails to specify the types of
property to which the lien may be attached.
Governments enacting superlien provisions should opt for alterna-
tive solutions to replenish superfunds. The solution must enable the
government to maintain funds necessary to be effective. Ideally, the
solution should go one step further and deter the proliferation of mis-
managed sites.
One such solution may be to increase the annual contributions in-
dustry must make to the superfund. This would place the costs of haz-
ardous waste cleanup directly on the responsible parties, 88 while
184. Id.
185. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
186. The bill H.R. 2767, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), would amend CERCLA by
adding the following section:
PRIORITY OF CLAIMS
Sec. 116(a) Any claim of the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a
State for the costs of removal or remedial action taken under section 104 of this
Act for which a debtor is liable under section 107 of this Act, and any claim of the
United States for any relief or fine for which a debtor is liable under section 106 of
this Act, shall have priority over all other classes of claims against such debtor,
without regard to whether such claims are secured.
187. The legislation also permits the federal government to impose the maximum
fines for CERCLA violations. See supra note 186. One author asserts that the optimal
solution advances welfare by minimizing the costs of avoiding the hazardous situation
and minimizing the costs of abating the hazard. See G. CALABREsi, THE CosTs OF
ACCIDENTS 26 (1970).
188. Congress considered the issue of financial responsibility for cleanups in connec-
tion with CERCLA:
The most desirable system of loss distribution is one in which the prices of goods
accurately reflect their full cost to society. This therefore requires, first, that the
cost of injuries be borne by the activities which caused them, whether or not fault is
involved, because, either way, the injury is a real cost of these activities.
S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1980) (emphasis added). A superlien provi-
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assuring the public that steps are being taken to keep toxic waste out of
the ground, water, and air through government regulation.
By requiring the hazardous waste industry to pay more into the
superfund, the government would deter entry into the field. Restrict-
ing entry, however, is desirable. If a generator is incapable of contrib-
uting more to the superfund, it is unlikely to have the necessary
resources to help fund a cleanup. The government, by restricting en-
try, can prevent undercapitalized and financially irresponsible firms
from entering the field, thus lessening the probability of later en-
counters with an insolvent party. In short, raising entry costs deters
financially weak, bankrupt-prone industrialists.
Forcing industry to maintain a larger superfund is also beneficial be-
cause it encourages the private sector to develop safer waste manage-
ment techniques. Private industry is constantly searching for methods
to cut costs. The knowledge that they must find their own cleanups by
contributing more into the superfund would motivate industry to de-
velope safer practices. Safer practices lead to fewer cleanups, thus re-
ducing the demands on the superfund.
Though abuse of the Bankruptcy Act seems inevitable, the govern-
ment can decrease the probability of sloppy waste management if it
continues to enforce waste management standards. The government
needs to maintain ample funds to act in case of an emergency cleanup.
Superlien statutes help maintain fiscal resources, but they penalize
blameless creditors rather than the responsible parties. Because bur-
dening generators is both more equitable and more effective, the gov-
ernment should require waste generators to contribute more into
superfunds.
Steven R. Selsberg*
sion is inconsistent with this statement because the subordinated creditors bear the cost
of injuries. In contrast, requiring generators to contribute more to the superfund would
be consistent with the statement. Even if a contributing generator never leaves a
cleanup for the government to oversee, it is more fair for the generator to bear the costs
than innocent creditors.
* JD. 1986, Washington University.
1987]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/17
COMMENTS
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol31/iss1/17
